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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

SEPTEMBER 30, 1985.

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am submitting a report on my study mission to the Philippines, August 2–15, 1985. This report gives my analysis of the situation in the Philippines as it has envolved in the year since the Committee staff's initial assessment in the summer of 1984. It also offers conclusions on the possible future course of events, including implications for U.S. policy.

FREDERICK Z. BROWN.

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INTRODUCTION

This report gives my impressions of some aspects of the current situation in the Philippines gained from a visit there, August 2-15, 1985. It is essentialy a continuation of the assessment begun in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report, "The Situation in the Philippines," October 1984, written by professional staff member Carl W. Ford, Jr., and myself.

The present report does not cover all aspects of the complex Philippines scene. It focuses on political developments—the Aquino affair, attitudes towards President Marcos, prospects for elections—and on the evolution of the communist insurgency, including trends in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

This report was drafted before the October 1985 mission of Senator Paul Laxalt to the Philippines.

In Manila I had separate audiences with President Marcos and Mrs. Marcos. I met with Acting Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Ramos (and ranking members of the military command), the Archbishop of Manila Jaime Cardinal Sin, several leaders of the democratic opposition, National Assembly Speaker Yniguez, business leaders including Marcos associate Eduardo Cojuangco, and numerous assemblymen from the ruling KBL party and opposition parties. There were also meetings with members of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the citizens election watchdog group NAMFREL.

I spent seven days traveling in the provinces, meeting with governors and lesser local officials, military officers, teachers, businessmen and church officials. A summary of meetings is at Appendix B.

My overall impression from this recent trip is that the political and insurgency situation in the Philippines has deteriorated further. The prospects for the near term (two years) are not good. Although Philippine society displays its traditional resilience and basic strengths, the root causes of deterioration remain and are likely to get worse unless there is a profound reversal of form by the Marcos government. Except for one new factor—the reform movement in the Armed Forces of the Philippines—there is little to suggest that such change is imminent.

I—THE POLITICAL CLIMATE

In last year's report we noted that frustration with the political situation was the dominant feeling expressed by many Filipinos. We found belief in and support for the democratic system but doubt that under President Marcos the system could be made to work as it should. We found a concensus that the present regime was politically bankrupt. We also found anxiety over the alternative to Marcos, be it the democratic opposition, a military junta or

the communist New People's Army (NPA). Although no one expected President Marcos to relinquish power voluntarily, a sense of impending change and an enthusiasm for political action—carried over from the turmoil of the Aquino assassination—were evident. These feelings were heightened in the fall of 1984 when the President's health appeared to be failing badly.

The Executive Summary of the October 1984 staff report is at Appendix A.

Attitudes toward the Marcos regime: Although these sentiments were still present in summer 1985, I found them juxtaposed with an awareness of President Marcos' ability, over the past nine months, to project an image of renewed personal vigor, political effectiveness and governmental control. Beginning in January, the President was visible on television and in public meetings under carefully controlled conditions and on short notice, implying that his health was unpredictable. He was increasingly available for media interviews. He made several strong speeches in government and New Society Movement (KBL) party forums, addressing such central issues as the economy, the insurgency, and legislation before the National Assembly. He demonstrated that he was still a strong tactician with the political skill and administrative means to upstage and out maneuver the opposition.

The Marcos mystique remains an important influence in the body politic. This is borne out in the July 1985 Bishops-Businessmen's Conference (BBC) poll, funded by the Asia Foundation and the Philippine private sector. The poll is the most recent empirically based, professionally conducted survey of Filipino attitudes available. The BBC's overall conclusion is that, despite clear discontent with important aspects of the government, President Marcos has some degree of support from a significant portion of the people and cannot be discounted as a political power in the country.

Without denying this residual strength, the many critics of Marcos with whom I spoke this summer put the President at the heart of the country's malaise. They stressed his reliance on political generals bent on preserving the status quo at virtually any cost, his reluctance to go beyond cosmetic economic reforms, and his refusal to let Acting Chief of Staff Ramos proceed with genuine military reforms. Even more often mentioned was the President's refusal to admit the seriousness of his illness. His death, it was felt, would throw the country into turmoil because of a failure to adopt measures, including a liberalization of the political atmosphere, that would make an orderly transition feasible.

At issue in the eyes of many Filipinos are not only procedures and laws but also the refusal by those in power to admit that someone other than Marcos might govern, that Philippine democracy might need fresh inspiration. A year ago some loyalists and critics alike expressed the hope that Marcos the patriot would prevail over Marcos the politician, that the President might take meaningful steps towards reforms and allow greater scope for the democratic process. No such hope was expressed by Filipinos of any political persuasion during this year's visit. The political atmosphere was even more bitterly polarized than in 1984. It remains extremely fragile.

Attitudes of President and Mrs. Marcos: In five hours of conversations first with President Marcos and then with Mrs. Marcos on August 14, I detected no moderation on the key elements of political or social change. On one level, they both seemed to be living in a fantasy world where the President has full possession of his physical powers and enjoys the overwhelming support of his people, and where the communist threat of 1985 is simply a manageable replay of the 1950's Huk rebellion. There were also suspicion and contempt for the democratic opposition, as well as a thinly disguised intention to use the electoral process not to strengthen the democratic process but to deflect domestic pressures and appease international opinion. There appeared to be a conviction that nothing more than the tactical, manipulative style of the past two decades is needed to meet the challenges of the present. Finally, in Malacanang Palace there was an aura of permanence of power, which seemed bizarre in view of the anxiety and uncertainty so evident elsewhere in the country.

Message for Congress: President and Mrs. Marcos are worried about their image in Congress and about hostile reporting in the U.S. media. Their purpose in granting me a private discussion was, simply put, to let the Senate Foreign Relations Committee know:

—that the Marcos government is in control of the present difficult situation in the Philippines;

—that President Marcos is the only individual with the power to guide the country through its troubles; and

—that American interests can best be protected by full and open support for the Marcos regime.

About the study of the U.S.-Philippines military bases agreement proposed in August in the National Assembly (by Defense Minister Enrile), President Marcos said that such an action was needed "to put the relationship back on a firm foundation and to defuse popular resentment of the bases." He advocated working out both a short-term (five- or six-year) agreement and a longer-term (20-year) strategic plan. However, the President emphasized, there was no need for major change in the defense relationship of the U.S. and the Philippines. Both the President and First Lady stressed two points: their ability to "manage" popular controversy over the bases and the untrustworthiness of any opposition figure in this regard. The specter of handing Clark and Subic over to the Soviet Union was not raised.

In our three-hour meeting, Mrs. Marcos articulated these themes a dozen ways. They can be summed up, in her words, as follows: ". . . You can trust the President. He is the only guy in this country who can lead the people. He knows the people and he knows his country like nobody else. This guy is head and shoulders above all those other little politicians. His health is fine, he's back to normal, you can count on him . . . we should stop this bickering in public . . . you don't pass any more critical sense of the Congress resolutions, then we won't have to pass similar resolutions in the National Assembly. As for the insurgency, only the President can handle it. He has always four or five different strategies for each situation. He's an old guerrilla fighter. He knows all the trails in the mountains, all the tricks. He will beat the communists just like we did in the 1950's. We are already turning things around and

we'll have them on the run soon. . . . We know how much those bases mean to you and we are the ones who can keep them here for you to use. Don't trust the others, they're just making political capital out of the issue. We may have to say some things too, but our heart is with the U.S. and you can count on us. . . ."

I promised to transmit the sense of the President's message to the Foreign Relations Committee. In addition, I offered the President and First Lady my observations on the state of the insurgency and on Congressional attitudes toward the Philippines, including an account of Senate deliberations on the foreign aid bill since March 1985.

The Aquino Affair: The seven-month trial of Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver and 25 military colleagues for the murder of opposition leader Benigno Aquino has ended. A verdict could be handed down soon. General Ver, Manila Military Commander Major General Prospero Olivas, and six others were charged as accessories to murder. The case was tried by judges appointed by President Marcos and acting under special guidelines drawn up by the President's office. The trial court chosen by the government was the *Sandigan Bayan,* a constitutionally mandated court established specifically to try criminal and civil cases against government employees accused of graft and corruption. The *Sandigan Bayan* normally does not try persons charged with conspiracy or capital offenses such as murder.

It is probable that General Ver will be acquitted for lack of evidence.

The government attempted to conduct the Ver trial with the appearance of legality. Over the months the judges found grounds to exclude almost all facts and testimony established by the Agrava Commission, whose majority findings pointed to involvement of General Ver and personnel under his command. (The Agrava Commission had also found to be without merit the government's original contention that an alleged communist-hired hit man, Rolando Galman, had killed Aquino.)

On August 30, 1985, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling to deny introduction of testimony of the defendants (including General Ver) before the Agrava Commission, testimony which had led to the indictment of Ver in the first place. This decision left the prosecution with very little evidence. Testimony by lower-ranking defendants likewise confirmed the defense's ability to make whatever case it found useful in contradiction of the evidence provided by the Agrava Commission.

Moreover, the prosecution refused on technical grounds to accept six affidavits by U.S. Air Force Officers. These affidavits stated that on August 21, 1983, as the China Air Lines plane carrying Aquino was approaching Philippine air space, Philippine Air Force officers took over the radar screens at a joint tactical operations center, scrambled jet aircraft and monitored the airliner's flight into Manila. This testimony, had it been introduced, would have contradicted General Ver's contention that he did not know Aquino's precise travel plans and so could not have arranged his murder immediately upon arrival. The manner in which the Philippine government handled the U.S. government's offer of this tes-

timony was further indication of a deliberate intention to prevent introduction of potentially incriminating evidence.

Although the government paid scrupulous attention to legal niceties and the semblance of due process, few Filipinos regard the conduct of the trial as just. On the contrary, most see the entire affair as an offensive, dreary farce. As General Ver's lawyer admitted publicly in early September, the trial "is not a forum for the search of historical truth . . . what is just is not necessarily legal, and what is legal is not necessarily just."

The Ver trial has been characterized by occasional intimidation of witnesses deemed hostile to the defendants and by a distinct lack of energy at crucial points on the part of the prosecution. According to knowledgeable Philippine lawyers, the ruling to disallow the Agrava evidence blatantly confused two basic principles of Philippine law: the right of witnesses to avoid self-incrimination (similar to the U.S. Constitution's fifth amendment) and the right of suspects to be warned of charges when arrested (equivalent to the Miranda ruling in U.S. law).

The vast majority of Filipinos do not believe the government's version of Aquino's murder—ardent KBL politicians readily admit this. The initial cover-up attempt, the Galman setup, the effort to turn the Agrava Commission findings around, the conduct of the Ver trial all point to the Marcos government's refusal to pinpoint responsibility. The acquittal of Ver will simply confirm this in the eyes of the public. Not only is the trial seen as unjust, the murder itself is seen as the quintescential "military abuse." Over the past two years it has emerged as a profoundly political act which has already damaged the Marcos government's credibility severely, probably irreparably. The net effect of the murder, its cover-up and the Ver trial has been to aid the communist cause immensely.

President Marcos has signaled his intention to reinstate General Ver as Chief of Staff. This reinstatement could be for a short face-saving period or longer. There is speculation that General Ver may be appointed to a new ministry combining the responsibilities of the Provincial Constabulary, the national police and the intelligence services. The U.S. Government has made clear that continued U.S. military assistance to the Philippines would be jeopardized if General Ver remains in a position of high authority. It is unlikely that changes in the command structure and basic motivation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines can take place as long as General Ver remains in control. These changes are essential if the AFP is to regain the confidence of the Filipino people and to combat the NPA insurgency successfully. Thus the final disposition of General Ver is of critical political importance. And the Aquino affair remains unresolved.

II—PROSPECTS FOR ELECTIONS IN 1986 AND 1987

November 1985 "Snap Election": On August 1 President Marcos announced that he was "seriously considering" resigning from office, calling a snap election, and offering himself in November 1985 as candidate for President for another six-year term. (Marcos' present term expires in May 1987; it has been generally assumed that he would run at that time.) Marcos' rationale: given charges

in the Philippine and international media and in the National Assembly that his government lacks genuine popular support, and given the pending impeachment resolution offered by the opposition in the National Assembly, a Presidential election sooner rather than later would stabilize the confused political situation. A "fresh mandate" would promote the government's counter-insurgency operations, which are suffering from the uncertainty surrounding the current situation.

President Marcos had also been angered by U.S. newspaper articles charging that he, Mrs. Marcos and their associates had amassed "hidden wealth" abroad in the form of real estate and other investments. These charges were echoed in the Philippine press and were reflected in the impeachment resolution.

On the same day, the President indicated that he might dissolve the National Assembly and hold new elections, presumably to reduce the opposition's minority position below its present one-third level.

Questions arose immediately about the constitutionality of a snap election and even its political desirability from Marcos' perspective. Dissolving the Assembly was ruled out, since if Marcos resigned in September (to run 60 days later in November), the Speaker of the National Assembly would under the law become interim President. Obviously this could not occur if the Speaker's position were abolished.

During my August trips to the provinces, elections were topic number one. From governors and their staffs on down to mayors and barrio captains, a single opinion prevailed: that Marcos would do what would be most advantageous to him politically and that his purpose in threatening a snap election was to maximize his chances of staying in power. Paradoxically, it was also widely believed that Marcos was acting in response to American pressure, as reported (erroneously) by *Newsweek* following CIA Director Casey's visit to Manila earlier this year.

On August 14 President Marcos indicated to me that a snap election was no longer necessary, saying that he had beaten down the impeachment resolution in the National Assembly. He speculated that he would surely win a heavy majority and "this would break the opposition's spirit; it would be bad for democracy." He also noted that elections would cost a lot of money. (The Commission on Elections, COMELEC, estimates that a countrywide election costs about US $20 million to administer. At least an equal amount would be spent by candidates to influence voters, if past experience is any guide.) Soon after our meeting, a KBL party caucus announced that the President had, for the time being, dropped the election idea.

In calling for a snap election, President Marcos demonstrated once again his mastery of political tactics and his control over the levers of power—the media, the National Assembly, the Article 6 decree power and the court system if need be, COMELEC and the administrative apparatus needed to bring off an election. The threat of a snap election forced the democratic opposition to dance to the President's tune. Timetables had to be revised and campaign strategies drafted on a crash basis.

Yet the snap election furor could also be seen as a demonstration of President Marcos' increasing political weakness. It showed him to be vacillating and uncertain. There was disagreement within the KBL on whether a November 1985 election would in fact benefit Marcos. His notion of dissolving the National Assembly and calling for a presidential election soon proved unworkable. Finally, some saw Marcos reacting in panic to an impeachment motion which in parliamentary terms had absolutely no chance of success. Some asked, why such fear?

May 1986 Local and Provincial Elections: The May 1986 elections are critical, since municipal and provincial officials elected then will conduct the May 1987 Presidential election. Discussions with the chairman and a senior member of the COMELEC led me to believe that the government, while mindful of the need for the facade of clean elections, will use the supposedly neutral COMELEC to encourage an outcome favorable to the ruling KBL party.

Three new members were recently appointed by President Marcos to the seven member COMELEC. None is considered to be of great administrative or legal stature; all have backgrounds indicating compliance with the KBL. Knowledgeable observers in Manila, including pro-KBL politicians, assume that the three new commissioners would probably rule in favor of the KBL in electoral disputes. Except for the COMELEC commission chairman himself, the prevailing opinion in Manila and the provinces was that the new commissioners are, to put it blunty, in the pocket of the President. When asked why it was necessary to pack the COMELEC so obviously with pro-KBL members, a senior COMELEC official stated that the one incumbent commissioner *not* beholden to the KBL "usually voted against the KBL, and that is not acceptable—he's a disruptive element."

There was speculation in August that the President would appoint one or two independent, or even pro-opposition, commissioners to COMELEC for a total of three non-KBL members out of seven. If this were to happen between now and next May, it would be a positive step. My discussions August 14 with President and Mrs. Marcos on precisely this point did not indicate that such appointments were compatible with their views of the coming elections.

NAMFREL's Problems: Leaders of the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) have no illusions about the difficulty of their task. The Marcos regime views NAMFREL as part of the opposition, and therefore open to political attack and fair game for administrative or other harassment. It is now doubtful that NAMFREL will be certified as the main citizens' election watchdog organization, a role which it performed effectively in the May 1984 National Assembly elections. The government was not pleased with the results of that election, since it yielded only a two-thirds majority for the ruling KBL party instead of the expected four-fifths. It is widely assumed that steps will be taken to preclude anything less than a sweeping KBL victory in the upcoming local and municipal elections.

One way to promote such a result would be to accredit an alternative citizens arm (perhaps the Junior Chamber of Commerce or some other youth body) and thus exclude NAMFREL. Another

would be to shut down the private radios which permitted NAMFREL to relay "quick-count" election results to Manila media outlets in May 1984, thereby making it harder for the government to falsify results. This could do be done through the power of the government to issue radio permits. An electoral law must be passed by the KBL-controlled National Assembly before year-end, and it can be tailored to the KBL's needs. Or the government could resort to other strategems using legal and administrative means to cripple NAMFREL and control the electoral process.

COMELEC has already indicated to NAMFREL leaders that the price of accreditation will be NAMFREL's agreement to turn over to the government the names and addresses of all NAMFREL volunteers countrywide. Given the history of government intimidation of poll-watchers, NAMFREL cannot accept this condition.

Three factors, however, may make it difficult for the Marcos regime to manipulate the May 1986 elections.

First, international (especially U.S.) media and public opinion will focus sharply on the elections, which will be viewed as a crucial test for the viability of Philippine democracy. Obvious widespread fraud would trigger Congressional reaction, with implications for future U.S. aid. Second, the Catholic Church, which provided essential manpower and organizational infrastructure for NAMFREL's 1984 effort, has made it plain that the 1986 (and 1987 Presidential) elections must be at least as clean as the 1984 elections. Third, there is some sentiment within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that the military establishment should not be used to influence the electoral process. Staff conversations with government officials in Manila and the provinces both this year and last yielded broad admission that the military in May 1984 did in fact interfere in many places to ensure victory for the KBL either through intimidation or outright stuffing of the ballot box. Many officers of the AFP may refuse to play such a role in 1986. The potential impact of such sentiment cannot be judged at this time, but certainly some elements of the military understand that fair elections are an important step in countering the political thrust of the Communist insurgency.

The Democratic Opposition: I had extended meetings with Salvador Laurel, who heads the largest democratic opposition faction (UNIDO—United Nationalist Democratic Organization), and several other opposition leaders. It is apparent that genuine unity still eludes the democratic opposition to President Marcos. UNIDO remains the best organized and most influential group nationwide. Laurel is the leading presidential contender, though the actual selection of an opposition standard bearer for 1987 remains somewhat vague and would depend in large measure on timing and circumstances of the election. If there were a snap election in the near future (and that remains a possibility), Laurel would be in a favorable position. There is an immense element of uncertainty about the whole political scene, however, since much depends on whether President Marcos is able to serve out his present term.

It is clear that other opposition leaders have not cast aside their aspirations. Many observers believe that Cory Aquino, widow of Ninoy, would enjoy broad electoral appeal. Without President

Marcos, the KBL party would suffer many defections and a realignment of the existing democratic opposition would take place.

The democratic opposition remains weak for a number of reasons. First, it cannot offer a credible alternative program in the National Assembly and has little scope for political activity otherwise. Its main platform is hostility to President Marcos; without a Presidential contest it is difficult to translate disaffection, no matter how widespread, into power. (In the May 1984 National Assembly elections, the opposition took advantage of this protest vote, did far better than anyone expected but did not get a majority.) Most opposition leaders have their roots in the same socio-economic system which produced President Marcos and consequently have trouble differentiating themselves from him.

But most important, President Marcos and his friends have great influence over or outright control of the major levers of power both within the government and in the private sector, including the media. This power was built up over 20 years of uninterrupted rule, including 10 years of martial law. It is not easily shaken even by the most charismatic opposition leader. Organization for a successful challenge could come only if the democratic process is permitted to operate freely over a period of time. A major step forward would be open and honest local and provincial elections in 1986, preceded by a similarly open campaign period. This would lay the groundwork for 1987 and transition.

Finally, it should be noted that some democratic opposition leaders are convinced that Marcos will never permit fair elections under any circumstances and that his departure from office is the essential first step. U.S. emphasis upon the electoral process, they claim, diverts attention from the principle task of getting rid of Marcos. It is possible that these democratic elements may refuse to participate, as was the case in May 1984 elections.

III—THE INSURGENCY

Last year's report offered the view that the NPA did not appear ready to mount a sustained nationwide campaign any time soon. In certain areas (Mindanao, Negros) the NPA might expand local control significantly but more guns, cadres and infrastructure were needed before the "objective conditions for revolution" would be achieved. Only then could the NPA drastically expand the scope of its military activity against the government.

Although a year ago the NPA revolution was apparently still in its first phase, the "strategic defensive," the time was approaching when it might have the capability to move on to "strategic stalemate." We pointed out that although countrywide the AFP was far stronger numerically than the NPA, it was already spread thin, with its attention and forces scattered. The AFP, we therefore concluded, would be hard pressed to contain the insurgency if the intensity of fighting increased or the geographic scope expanded.

The strong impression gained from this year's visit—after weighting evidence from many sources—is that the communist NPA insurgency has made significant gains quantitatively and qualitatively over the past year in both the military and political

arenas. Last year, insurgency trends in the countryside were disturbing. This year, the situation is alarming.

The insurgency is already in a position to become the principle politico-military influence in many areas of the country and even to exclude the government from some areas. Evidence points to a worsening of the government's position and a strengthening of the insurgents' position countrywide. Trends are especially unfavorable in Negros, Mindanao, Samar, Central Luzon and parts of the Bicol peninsula. The province of Bataan, strategically located between Clark and Subic, has emerged as another critical NPA hotbed. The NPA has exploited popular discontent over construction of a nuclear power plant, using both the communist-controlled National Democratic Front (NDF) and noncommunist protest groups.

Extent of Communist Influence: The NPA is exerting greater influence, even control, over an increasing number of *barangays* (divisions similar to hamlets which make up the municipalities of a Philippine province). This is true not only in rural areas but also in population centers. The most dramatic example is Davao City, where parts of the metropolitan area are for practical purposes off-limits to the government's presence except by means of military expeditions. NPA taxation is common in many rural areas, to a far greater extent than last year's research indicated. Teach-ins, propagandizing, recruitment, and putting into place of political cadres have accelerated. Once in place, the NPA political presence is difficult to dislodge, particularly when buttressed by the threat of violence. According to many local officials, the government lacks the means to prevent NPA intrusion. The problem increases geometrically as the NPA establishes safe areas from which its influence then spreads to other contested areas.

A textbook example of insurgency is the town of Claveria, an hour's drive from the city of Cagayan de Oro on Mindanao. Claveria, which I visited twice over fourteen months, was a prosperous and peaceful agricultural center several years ago. Caught up in a cycle of NPA invasion, government riposte and population flight, Claveria's outer *barangays* are now contested battlegrounds; its population center has been the scene of NPA raids and sporadic fire fights. More than half its *barangays* do not welcome government representatives. Claveria's story is being repeated in towns all over the Philippines.

The government has estimated that in August 1985, 28 percent of the country's 41,000 *barangays* suffered some degree of NPA threat or presence (official terminology is "threatened," "infiltrated" and "influenced," in ascending degrees of gravity). If the urban *barangays* of Metro Manila, Cebu and larger cities are deducted from this total, it is apparent that close to one-half of the rural areas are subject to some sort of NPA influence, however defined. U.S. government sources consider this a conservative estimate of NPA activity.

Increased Use of Terror: There has been a surge in assassinations, abductions, threats of violence, extortion and coercive behavior in general on the part of the NPA. Last year we noted that, while the NPA was brutal, it generally used violence instrumentally to achieve political ends. At that time, the NPA appeared to be relying primarily on selective violence, on persuasion, and on positive

actions that made the NPA "alternative government" look relatively attractive.

My impression this year derives from personal observations, from what lower-level people (town officials, teachers, businessmen) told me along the road, and from Philippine government and U.S. sources. Dozens of examples were cited of how the government's influence is being driven from the countryside by terror tactics. Anxiety over NPA pressures was very marked.

Terror cuts two ways. The NPA is making more enemies by such behavior. Some backlash is likely. But the government is being revealed as relatively powerless to protect its citizens. Modest government programs in many rural areas are already being curtailed. International development projects designed to help rural areas are also affected. One example: NPA raids and threats have caused the Australian government to withdraw or suspend indefinitely important agricultural research and road building projects on Samar Island. The NPA has invited the Australians to "come back after liberation."

Politically, the NPA may have enough control in certain areas that it no longer has to be concerned about the reactions of the local population. In the long run, of course, this could hurt the communist cause. Now, however, it is gaining them a tactical advantage and eroding government control over key geographic areas.

Accommodation: It is not surprising that many people in the countryside are doing what they must to survive in an increasingly polarized atmosphere. For those without effective government protection, that means accommodating the NPA presence, paying taxes, making "contributions," listening to propaganda lectures, and even providing corvee labor. Again, this was revealed in numerous unstructured, spontaneous conversations. It was also described in more analytical terms by several mayors and *barangay* officials. Rather than something shameful, accommodation was presented as necessary and rational, given the shifting political winds and realities of power. I heard a dozen reports in the Bicol Peninsula of how small plantation owners have been given the option of becoming "partners" with the NPA or of staying away from their lands. The deal: cultivate and harvest in peace—and share the proceeds scrupulously with the NPA. This attitude is ominous since it implies an increasing acceptance of the NPA as the dominant influence in many areas.

Increased NPA Military Strength and Tactical Capability: Estimates of NPA strength vary. U.S. sources say that armed NPA forces have grown steadily in the past year, with close to 20,000 armed regulars and many times that number partially armed village militia. Last year we were rarely told of NPA units larger than 50 men; this year reports from various sources including Philippine military officers routinely refer to NPA units of 100 or more. In eastern Quezon province, one municipal official told of a sighting the previous night of 300 NPA troops in the vicinity; this report was confirmed an hour later by a military officer, who stated that these were NPA recruits being taken off for training, not armed regulars. This refinement would seem to be small comfort.

It is generally agreed that the NPA combat strength is growing fast countrywide, and that in Negros and parts of Samar and Mindanao, it may equal or exceed the government's. Only when the government masses its forces for an operation against a specific NPA target is the ratio of forces heavily in the government's favor. Many government units are tied down to static defense positions.

The AFP claims that the proportion of incidents initiated by friendly forces to those initiated by the NPA has turned in the government's favor—from 24 percent in the second quarter of 1984 to 37 percent in the second quarter of 1985 and close to half in the third quarter of 1985. The AFP admits that the net exchange of weapons captured or lost continues to run in favor of the NPA. In the first six months of 1985 the AFP had suffered a net loss of 882 weapons, including 428 in one NPA raid on a Negros Occidental armory.

Few officials, military or civilian, claim that the government forces are carrying the fight to the enemy with some newly discovered vigor. Privately, I was repeatedly told that the AFP, as a rule, avoids contact with the NPA when possible and that aggressive night patrols, for example, are rare. Even with some increased AFP initiative in 1985, the NPA appears to maintain the advantages of mobility, the element of surprise, and choice of time and geography for engagement.

Not all observers share these views. Some analysts looking at the available data conclude that the NPA is having severe growing pains, that its increased numerical strength has placed unmanageable demands on its supply system, and that as a result it is having a hard time feeding, clothing and arming new recruits. The NPA's failures in this regard, it is said, have weakened the discipline and effectiveness of the fighting units. Possibly more significant in the long run, the heavy taxation of everyone—not just the wealthy—and the use of intimidation have alienated much of NPA's "natural constituency." Increasingly, it is claimed, the people (especially in rural areas) are seeing the NPA as bandits, not liberators.

These observations are no doubt significant. But the fact remains that insurgency trends are continuing to run against the government. No serious observer would maintain that the insurgency situation in September 1985 is better from the Philippine government's perspective than in September 1983, let us say, and certainly not better than in September 1981. The NPA may or may not have reached a plateau in some respects. But the more relevant questions are: How long will it take the NPA to regroup for another move upward? And what is the government doing to reverse the underlying conditions which make possible the continued, steady NPA expansion?

Importance of the Economy: A major factor in the growth of the insurgency and the inability of the government to combat it is the continued deterioration of the Philippine economy. Space does not permit a detailed report of my discussions on a range of economic matters during this visit. My general conclusion is that the Philippine economy, already in bad shape last year, has continued to decline in virtually every significant category. There has been negative growth nationwide for the second year in a row. Although interest rates have dropped, there is no money for bank loans in the

countryside; poor farmers, I was told, are in increasingly desperate condition. Everywhere I visited in the provinces I was told by businessmen and local officials that the state of the economy was measurably worse this year compared to last and that there was no prospect of improvement, particularly as long as the insurgency was on the ascendency.

The NPA and the National Democratic Front (NDF) make valuable use of themes which are primarily political: the Aquino murder, military abuses, and the like. But it is unemployment, low prices for copra and basic crops, high costs of fertilizer and fuel, and extremely depressed economic conditions of the rural areas (and of the Manila and Davao slums) which have probably done more to radicalize the people and turn them against the government. The issues of official corruption and economic inequity, as noted in last year's report, have assumed important dimensions politically because they exist in an environment where so many Filipinos have been pushed to the wall economically and see their very survival threatened.

The NPA has been able to capitalize on the desperation of these people by pointing to the government's failures and by promising a better life. For example, land distribution, or the prospect of it, in those areas where the NPA can exert control has become a potent weapon in gaining support of the people. The government maintains that if the Philippine economy is able to pull out of its present depression, the insurgency will lose its appeal and eventually evaporate. Granted that improved economic conditions would work to the government's advantage, the real questions are whether the government is actually taking emergency measures quickly enough and whether it will be willing to take longer term, structural measures carrying political risk of another sort.

IV—TRENDS IN THE MILITARY

Military Abuses and the Human Rights Environment: Last year's report cited military abuses and human rights violations as principle causes of political disaffection. The report described how the NPA has exploited these abuses and how the government's failure to redress grievances had antagonized the populace and promoted the insurgency.

This year's visit uncovered both positive and negative evidence of government efforts to turn the situation around. The AFP's reluctance to discuss this sensitive subject with foreigners is understandable, particularly given the increasingly brittle U.S.-Philippines bilateral relationship. Nonetheless, I had frank conversations on military abuses with General Ramos and his staff in Manila as well as with ranking officers in the Southern Luzon and Samar/Leyte Islands Regional Unified Commands (RUC). There appears to be greater awareness than a year ago of the need for the AFP to minimize abuses, to discipline abusive personnel, and to relate more effectively to the civilian population. Regulations have been promulgated, speeches denouncing "indiscipline" made, and statistics produced to prove that the AFP is moving energetically on these matters. In the military command briefings I attended, there was an effort to paint a positive picture. If the AFP has indeed

become more concerned about abuses, this must be counted as a step forward.

How much has actually been accomplished in the field is a different question. Other information acquired during this visit and conversations with knowledgeable Filipino sources indicate that corrective actions so far are by and large cosmetic. One senior Philippine official stated flatly nothing has changed and that the attention being paid to the problem of military abuse is primarily for the benefit of U.S. and other international observers. Several Philippine and U.S. officials were skeptical about government statistics on disciplinary action against abusive personnel and on training designed to prevent abuses in the first place.

Early in 1985, General Ramos promulgated special corrective regulations including establishment of regional disciplinary barracks. Many observers believed this was a sign of progress. A few months later, however, President Marcos indicated that regional disciplinary barracks had proved unworkable because operational units were being depleted. The remedy of "training in place" was substituted. Both Philippine and U.S. officials doubt that such measures can have the necessary corrective effect given the AFP's attitudes and command structure.

Discharging military personnel from the service after they have been found guilty of serious abuses is still standard practice. It is difficult for outsiders to establish if guilty military personnel, even those convicted of serious crimes, are punished beyond being discharged from the service. The Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) continues to have a reputation as abusive and undisciplined. In many areas it is cordially detested by the civilian population. To General Ramos' staff and at each RUC visited, I posed the question: How many AFP personnel, including CHDF, have been accused of capital crimes in the past three years? How many tried? How many convicted? What were the usual sentences? I could get no responses to these questions from any Philippine government official. Similarly, questions on individual cases were ducked or simply not answered.

Fresh abuses continue to come to light; past abuses remain unresolved perpetuating popular resentment of the military and undermining the government. Father Tullio Favali, a popular parish priest, was murdered in North Cotabato, Mindanao, by local militia in the presence of dozens of eyewitnesses. His case took a familiar path: investigation, cover-up, publicity, reinvestigation, and then apprehension of CHDF members—who may or may not be tried and convicted. It is widely believed in North Cotabato that Favali was killed on orders from above. The NPA have taken full advantage of the situation. The area is now bitterly politicized against the government.

In a similar incident in 1985 in Cebu, another priest, Father Rudi Romano, was abducted by men driving a car with official plates. He is still missing. His disappearance has become a national *cause celebre* for the Catholic church and has also provided a valuable anti-government rallying point for the left.

The Tungao case, described in last year's staff report, has been swept under the rug by the government. Earlier this year 200 NPA guerrillas took over the town center and propagandized for several

hours. A government military unit two kilometers away did not react. According to an area resident (who is resolutely anti-communist), Tungao is now under heavy NPA influence, if not control.

The unresolved case of the "Langoni Nine" involving the "salvaging" of nine local men near Bacolod, the capital of Negros Occidental, continues to symbolize the absence of justice in one of the Philippines most economically depressed areas. That case has been eclipsed, however, by an incident on September 20, 1985, when security forces in Escalante, on the northeast coast of Negros, opened fire on demonstrators commemorating the imposition of martial law. At least 27 people were killed. This incident, plus the collapse of the sugar industry, has helped make Negros, already heavily influenced by the NPA, a tinderbox of anti-government sentiment and social discontent.

Murders or abductions of journalists and radio commentators over the past year are too numerous to list; rightly or wrongly, they have become focal points for popular resentment of the government. There has also been a pattern of arrests of human rights lawyers active in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. The Presidential Preventive Detention Act (PDA), in effect a martial law measure, continues in use and (according to the BBC poll mentioned previously) is widely resented.

The quality of the AFP's leadership—its command attitude—is obviously of fundamental importance. No doubt many AFP officers understand that the military will be grievously handicapped in the counterinsurgency effort if abuses continue and are attempting within their jurisdiction to curb violations. Yet these officers are not inclined to risk their careers by contravening accepted practices. Without unequivocal instructions from the top, it is difficult for the most conscientious officer to achieve more than token improvement in containing military abuses. If the central government is demonstrably unwilling to act against the murderers of Aquino, commanders of AFP field units cannot be expected to act against abuses by their subordinates. The example is set by Manila.

It should be understood that, to bring about a change in public perceptions, the AFP would have to live down a reputation for abuse built up over years, just as the government's legal/judicial system would have to reverse years of failure to redress grievances and render justice. With the best intentions and immediate reforms, the Philippine government, as represented by the AFP army and the judicial system, would still bear the heavy load of hatred and suspicion garnered from past incidents. Politically, the effects will linger a long time.

Reforms Within the AFP: Even the harshest critics of the Marcos government recognize that the Philippines must have a professional army of high quality to defend the democratic system no matter who sits in Malacanang.

Leadership is the key element in any significant reform of the AFP, but not the only one. Reorganization is needed. So is material assistance to provide equipment, pay and allowances for the soldiers; better basic training; unit transportation and communication; troop housing; logistical infrastructure; and weapons systems better suited to counterinsurgency operations.

The military budget has been cut year after year as the country's economic predicament has worsened. Lack of funds remains a formidable obstacle to modernization. Within current limitations, however, the AFP appears to be making earnest efforts to lay the groundwork for a better-equipped, better-supported and more professionally managed military establishment. (There is also more realism: F-16s and missile systems are no longer on the government's shopping list.) The U.S. Mission in Manila follows closely specific programs to upgrade the AFP.

It would be naive to conclude that the AFP is already on its way to reform and a bright future. Serious leadership and political problems persist and indeed could slow or halt reform. No outsider can calculate accurately how much progress has been made, or can realistically be expected, in breaking the pattern of abuses. Genuine improvement will take years, not months. But the past year has seen the Philippine professionals come to grips with many of the AFP's material and organizational problems. Corrective plans have been drawn up and some initial steps taken.

Another possibly significant development is the emergence of a reform group of AFP officers. Initially fostered by younger active duty officers from recent classes of the Philippine Military Academy, the reform movement now embraces retired personnel and some higher-ranking active duty officers. The concerns of the reform group have been made known to the army's leaders, including Minister of Defense Enrile and President Marcos. It remains to be seen how successful the reformists are in bringing about constructive change in the armed forces establishment. The reappointment of General Ver would render this fresh spirit in the AFP impotent, since reform will be automatically equated with disloyalty.

V—CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

1. President Marcos has been able in recent months to project an image of renewed political effectiveness and personal vigor. Although displaying somewhat greater unity, the democratic opposition remains uncertain and frustrated by Marcos' control of the levers of power and tactical agility.

2. There is an atmosphere of unreality, delusion and suspended animation at the top level of the government. The political situation is extremely fragile, since the President's health, though currently improved, could worsen rapidly.

3. President Marcos' objective is to stay in power, not to promote change which could endanger his position. Health permitting, he intends to run for office again in 1987 and expects to remain in power indefinitely.

4. President Marcos has not gotten the U.S. message about the urgent need for reform. U.S. demands for reform are perceived to run counter to Marcos' own interests. While Marcos seeks to reconsolidate his power, the U.S. urges him to share it with others, to decentralize, to reform the very elements of his regime that permit him to remain in control.

5. The U.S. can expect a strident, combative posture from Marcos. As in the past, he will attempt to manage his problems (including U.S. pressure for a reform) tactically, yielding minimum

concessions to either the U.S. or his domestic critics. Philippine nationalism is an increasingly important factor in the political equation.

6. President Marcos either does not understand or refuses to admit the seriousness of the communist insurgency threat. This attitude is reflected downward in the government.

7. U.S. policy since the Aquino assassination is not credible in the Philippines. Marcos believes that he enjoys the support of the highest levels of the Executive branch of U.S. government. Congress may huff and puff, Assistant Secretaries may harass him, and some of his military aid monies may be transferred to ESF. But in the end, he believes, the U.S. will not pull its support. Many Filipinos seem to share this view.

8. President Marcos is convinced that Clark and Subic give him whip handle. He interpreted the $70 million level for military assistance as evidence of the Administration's desire to satisfy him and reverse the House efforts to cut MAP/FMS. In the future he will hold U.S. policy hostage to the bases whenever possible.

9. The 1986 local and provincial elections are crucial to the future of the Philippines. If they are conducted in a way which continues the healthy trend of the May 1984 National Assembly elections, chances for survival of Philippine democracy will be enhanced. If the Filipino people judge them in contempt of the popular will, further polarization and disillusion with the political system will push the presently democratic center closer to the left. A skewed election will materially assist the CPP/NPA and move the communists closer to the critical political mass necessary for "strategic stalemate."

10. The government understands the importance of the image of free, fair and open elections in 1986 but so far has given few indications that it will permit this to occur. President Marcos' attitude, events relative to COMELEC and NAMFREL, the atmosphere surrounding instructions to government officials and policy guidelines to the KBL—all these imply the government's intention to do what is necessary to achieve a strong KBL majority.

11. Regarding the insurgency, time is short. The question is no longer whether the government can reverse adverse trends but whether it can stop the hemorrhage. Last year we stated that the Marcos government was in effect the NPA's best weapon. This may still be true. But the NPA has now achieved a momentum of its own to carry it forward politically and militarily.

12. The management of the Ver trial and the unresolved Aquino murder have severely undermined the credibility of the Marcos government. The acquittal of Ver is all but certain. His reinstatement as Chief of Staff at least temporarily or appointment to a cabinet post in charge of internal security is possible. President Marco's decision on General Ver's fate will be important in determining future directions of Philippine military leadership and its ability to defeat the armed challenge of the NPA.

13. The reform movement within the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is a positive development, as are initial steps toward modernization and reorganization.

APPENDIX A

OCTOBER 1984 SFRC STAFF REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MAY 14, 1984 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

● In a surprisingly strong showing, opposition parties won almost one-third of 183 seats in the National Assembly in an election viewed internally and by foreigners as a test of Philippine democracy.

● The boycott movement by radical oppositionists failed badly; 85 percent of registered voters went to the polls. There were scattered disruptions by the Communist Party's New People's Army (NPA) but without discernible effect.

● The election represented an extraordinary outpouring of popular support for the democratic process. The citizen watchdog group NAMFREL (National Citizens Movement for a Free Election) received prime credit for monitoring balloting countrywide and minimizing irregularities.

● It is widely believed that a number of government candidates were elected as result of coercion, rigging or other forms of fraud. NAMFREL and outside observers believed that the opposition could have won close to a majority had government-inspired fraud not taken place. Nonetheless, the election was generally judged an important expression of popular sentiment.

● The election created at least the possibility of an effective parliamentary opposition, although opposition elements are not yet united in tactics and goals.

● The election sent Marcos a clear demand for moderation in the exercise of political power. His aura of invincibility and Mrs. Marcos' personal prestige were tarnished. Although Marcos now has clear legislative superiority by reason of his party's 2 to 1 majority and decree powers under Amendment 6 of the Constitution, it will be difficult to ignore or overrule entirely opposition sentiment in the National Assembly.

● The election was a "success" in the context of the Philippines' turbulent electoral history. However, its greatest significance was to underscore demands for political reform and restoration of democratic practices lost under martial law.

● Without further progress in this direction in the 1986 local and 1987 Presidential elections, the May 14 election could become a symbol of political frustration and lead to deepened polarization of a society already dangerously split.

THE POLITICAL CLIMATE: CRISIS OF GOVERNMENT

● Political and economic tensions have increased greatly since the Aquino assassination. Although root causes are not new, the

people hold the Marcos government responsible for a deterioration which has grown progressively worse.

- A disciplined, purposeful Communist insurgency with sophisticated political infrastructure and growing military capability countrywide has become a major threat to Philippine democracy.
- The insurgency's greatest strengths are the abuses, inefficiencies, corruption and complacency of a regime long in power.
- There has been a profound loss of confidence in President Marcos and his ability to govern. The country's leadership is virtually bankrupt in terms of public confidence. There appears to be little popular expectation that the leadership will act for the good of the country as opposed to its own narrow interests.
- Although a certain mystique still clings to President Marcos personally, people doubt that he can recapture his earlier dynamism or free himself from the influence of special interests, even were he inclined to do so.
- President Marcos' practice of saying one thing and then doing the opposite has damaged his authority. He has appeared confused and misleading in representing the insurgency threat. Most disturbing is the fact that the insurgency—the rationale for imposing martial law 12 years ago—is stronger today than ever before. There is doubt that the Marcos regime either understands fully or can cope effectively with the Communist threat.
- The Aquino assassination has been a potent blow to the Marcos regime's credibility. It has changed the political scene fundamentally. It has galvanized the political center of Philippine society into active opposition, as evidenced by the May 14 election, and has provided a rallying point for the Left. The government's version of the assassination is generally not believed.
- The assassination also deepened the already serious deterioration in the economy by spurring capital flight and precipitating a debt crisis which is now in its second year.
- The situation is complicated by the emergence of the National Democractic Front, which is heavily influenced by the Communist Party yet has participation of non-Communist elements who seek effective means of expressing their opposition. Moderate oppositionists who hope to stay within the democratic system are increasingly caught in the middle. Reimposition of martial law would heighten this dilemma.
- There is widespread resentment of corruption, cronyism and economic inequality. There is a general perception that the leadership, their families and business associates have made billions of dollars out of the Philippine economy, sent much of it permanently out of the country, and ruined the economy in the process through mismanagement. The use of the Presidential decree power for special advantage is criticized.
- The example of corruption and abuse of power by the leadership for private ends has "legitimized" similar practices throughout the country. Corruption, mismanagement and diversion of economic resources into the crony system have contributed significantly to the current economic crisis.
- There is antagonism between the government and the Catholic Church.

● President Marcos appears to have the power to retain control indefinitely one way or another, but his tenure appears increasingly insecure. Marcos still holds important levers of power and can count on a number of influential supporters within and without the government. He remains a master of survival politics and an astute tactician. Despite serious lapses, he remains a shrewd judge of the Philippine political scene. Yet Marcos' ability to work his political will has eroded and economic difficulties have been extremely damaging to him.

● Many Filipinos feel that the longer President Marcos clings to power the less chance there will be for the emergence of fresh democratic leadership and a moderate government capable of meeting the challenge of the NPA. Thus far, Marcos has attempted to stifle challenges to his rule and has labeled most such efforts as "subversive." This has further alienated many moderates.

● Nonetheless, there have been some positive developments since May 14. The new National Assembly counts a number of vigorous, effective opposition members who could emerge as leaders. The KBL is showing a new spirit and the Assembly is now an active forum of debate. These are hopeful signs.

The Philippine Insurgency

● The NPA is the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines. It follows classic Marxist-Leninist tactics adapted by Mao and applied in a Philippine context. It is the proselytizing organ of the CPP, and it provides the political and administrative infrastructure for NPA-influenced areas in the countryside. Its objective is destruction of Philippine democracy as well as the Marcos government.

● The insurgency has made big gains in the past 2 years but, barring a total collapse of either the Marcos regime or the economy, the NPA does not appear ready to mount a sustained nationwide offensive. Armed strength is estimated at 12,500 countrywide—and growing.

● Thus far, the insurgency appears to be an internal revolution receiving little or no outside support.

● The NPA exploits problems in the society, such as the loss of confidence in the Marcos regime, recurring military abuses and the deteriorating economic situation, far more than it relies on Communist indoctrination to win converts. Intimidation and terror, including murder and summary executions, also play important roles in the process.

● There are doubts whether the civilian government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are up to meeting the Communist challenge. Such a complex task requires a coordinated effort on the part of many departments and agencies; thus far coordination has been deficient.

● The AFP has recently changed its military equipment procurement priorities to meet the insurgency threat but remains in dire need of upgrading in many respects.

● There is widespread antagonism, against the AFP in the countryside. The NPA makes political capital out of military abuses and uses the government's alienation of the countryside to build a following.

Questions for the Future

- Extreme frustration with the Marcos regime and anxiety about whether Philippine democracy can meet the difficult challenges now facing the country are dominant feelings.
- Some fear that parliamentary niceties and traditional politics may become irrelevant and that the future of the country may be decided in the streets (and in the hills) where the CPP and NPA could have the advantage.
- But the Philippine attachment to democratic forms and values is strong. A number of key events and political trends bear watching:
  - —The verdict of the Agrava Board investigating the Aquino assassination which, if high ranking military officers are implicated, will have great political impact.
  - —Uncertainty over Presidential succession;
  - —Marcos' treatment of the new National Assembly and his use of the decree power;
  - —The role of the opposition in the National Assembly and emergence of its leadership;
  - —The 1986 local and 1987 Presidential elections;
  - —Treatment of the media as an indicator of liberalization;
  - —The attitude of the military and the possibility of its greater involvement in politics.
- The larger issues of the economy, the growth of the NPA, whether the substance of Philippine democracy can be repaired, and whether fundamental changes in the socio-economic system can be made in time—these will be major determinants of events.

APPENDIX B

Visit to the Philippines, August 3-15, 1985—Summary of Meetings and Activities—Staff Delegate Frederick Z. Brown

Saturday, August 3

Evening. Arrive Manila

Sunday, August 4

Breakfast with presidential candidate Salvador Laurel, leader of United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and National Assemblymen Jose B. Laurel, Neptali Gonzales, Luis Villafuerte, and Rafael Recto, all members of UNIDO.

10:00 a.m.—5:00 p.m., drive around Rizal and Laguna Provinces. Call on Mayor of Santa Maria, Rizal.

Evening meeting with Liberal Party co-leader Jovito Salonga, Liberal Party members from Samar Province and National Assemblyman Tony Cuenco (Pilipino Democratic Party—Laban Party).

Monday, August 5

Breakfast with Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Victorino Savellano and Commissioner Jaime Opinion.

10:00 a.m. Meeting with U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Kaplan and members of U.S. country team.

Lunch with Dr. Agerico Lacanlale, Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister.

2:30 p.m. Meeting with Pilipino Democratic Party—Laban Secretary General Jose S. ("Peping") Cojuangco, Jr. and Cory (Mrs. Benigno) Aquino.

3:30 p.m. Call on Jaime Cardinal Sin.

5:30-9:00 p.m. Visit National Assembly. Call on Speaker Nicanor Yniguez. Meetings with new Society Movement (KBL) and opposition National Assemblymen including Edilberto del Valle, Emanual Garcia, Vicente Valley, Homobono Adaza, Tony Cuenco.

Tuesday, August 6

Morning. Drive through Pampanga Province to Bataan Province. Call on Rear Adm. Kohn, Commander of Subic Naval Base. Command briefing and tour base.

Afternoon. Visit Bataan Refugee Processing Center for U.S.-Bound Indochinese refugees. View Bataan nuclear power generating facility.

6:00 p.m. Call on Governor of Bataan Province Efren Pascual. Return to Manila.

Wednesday, August 7

Breakfast with leaders of National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) including Chairman Jose Concepcion and Christian Monsod and others.

10:00 a.m. Meeting with Dr. Hezel Gacutan, President's Center for Special Studies, and associates.

Lunch with Deputy Minister of National Defense Jose Crisol.

3:00 p.m. Meeting with Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI) Chairman Fulgencio Factoran and associates.

4:00 p.m. Meeting with Makati Business Club.

Evening. Depart for Quezon Province. Spend night at Villa Escudero Resort, San Pablo.

Thursday, August 8

9:00 a.m. Call on Regional Unified Command 4 (RUC 4), Lucena. Briefing and discussions with Deputy RUC Commander Colonel Manuel and staff officers.

Drive through Quezon and Caramines Norte Provinces. Calls on church, school and municipal officials and military officers at various towns en route to Naga City, Caramines Sur Province. Side trip to Guinayangan.

Dinner and evening discussions with Governor (KBL Party) of Caramines Sur Province Felix Fuentebella, Bishop Sofio Balce, Executive Judge Juan Llaguno, provincial planning and development officials and aides to the Governor.

Friday, August 9

Breakfast with Mayor (UNIDO) of Naga City and opposition leaders of Caramines Sur.

10:00 a.m. Briefing by Governor Fuentebella and provincial officials at provincial capitol. Briefing at Bicol River Basin Development Program.

Drive through Caramines Sur and Albay Provinces. Calls in towns of Iriga, Buhi, Oas and Baao.

Call on Regional Unified Command 5 (RUC 5), Legaspi City. Briefing and discussion with Deputy Commander Colonel Taduran and staff, including commander of Provincial Constabulary Colonel Cesar Averilla.

Dinner and evening discussions with Governor (KBL) of Albay Province Felix Imperial and advisors.

Saturday, August 10

Breakfast with Governor Imperial.

Drive through Albay and Sorsogon Provinces. Calls en route on local officials. Call on National Assemblyman (KBL) Augusto Ortiz in Sorsogon City with Mayors Dorotan (Irosin) and Garcia (Bacon).

Cross San Bernadino Strait to Samar Island and then to Catarman, capital of Northern Samar province.

Dinner and evening discussions with National Assemblyman (KBL) del Valle and Brig. Gen. Benjamin Cruz, Philippine Army brigade commander in Northern Samar.

Sunday, August 11

Breakfast with Assemblyman del Valle. Road excursion east of Catarman. Call on local church officials.

Drive through Western Samar province to Catbalogan. Call on Regional Unified Command 8 (RUC 8). Discussion with RUC staff.

Arrive Tacloban City, Leyte province. Briefing by regional and provincial development staffs.

Call on Acting Bishop of Tacloban, Filomeno G. Bactol and advisors.

Dinner and evening discussions with barangay captain Philip Romualdez, son of Ambassador to the U.S. and Governor of Leyte Province Benjamin Romauldez (brother of Mrs. Imelda Marcos) and leaders of his municipality.

Monday, August 12

Breakfast with Brigadier General Salvador Mison, Commander RUC 8 and staff discussion.

Helicopter tour of Leyte Island. Stop at Inopacan, west coast town in NPA-threatened area. Meeting with mayor, municipal staff and military officers. Return to Tacloban.

Lunch with Leyte bank and business leaders. Visit Tacloban City and vicinity. Fly back to Manila.

Tuesday, August 13

Morning. Fly Manila-Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental (Mindanao Island). Breakfast discussion with Prudencio T. Plaza, Jr., Cagayan de Oro Timber Company; Balbino B. Privaldoz, Jr., Cagayande Oro Electric Power and Light Company; Aldrico T. Manus, Integrated Livestock and Poultry Raisers Co-op.

Drive to Claveria municipality, NPA-threatened area. Discussion with mayor and staff.

Lunch with Father Mariano Varella, Executive Vice President, Xavier University.

Meeting with Isagani San Agustin, Chairman NAMFREL, Misamis Oriental. Fly Cagayan de Oro—Manila.

6:30–9:00 p.m. Private meeting with Acting Chief of Staff, Philippine Armed Forces, General Fidel Ramos, followed by command briefing and staff discussions.

Wednesday, August 14

Breakfast discussion with National Assemblywoman Eva Kalaw, opposition Assemblymen Fabian Sison and Lito Atienza, and other advisors to Mrs. Kalaw.

10:45 a.m. Call on Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. Benjamin Romauldez.

11:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m. Meeting with President Ferdinand Marcos.

2:00–2:30 p.m. Meeting with U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth.

5:00–8:15 p.m. Meeting with Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

8:30 p.m. Dinner arranged by National Assemblymen del Valle and Garcia and associates.

10:00–12:00 p.m. Meeting with leading businessman and KBL supporter Eduardo ("Danding") Cojuangco.

Thursday, August 15

Depart Manila for Washington.

○